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Pre‐Election	Violence	 0.30	 0.46	 0.00	 1.00	 n.a.	 n.a.	
Post‐Election	Protest	 0.14	 0.34	 0.00	 1.00	 0.36	 0.11	
Post‐Election	Violence	 0.06	 0.24	 0.00	 1.00	 n.a	 n.a	
Victory	Uncertain	 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.33	 0.52	
Polling	Unfavorable		 0.76 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.82	 0.74	
Executive	Constraints	 4.84 2.07 1.00 7.00 3.93	 5.17	
Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 3.19 2.31 0.00 8.00 4.64	 2.58	
Polity	(avg)		 2.35 6.87 ‐10.00 10.00 ‐0.67	 3.52	
Executive	Recruitment	(avg)		 6.15 2.15 1 8 5.33	 6.21	
Political	Competition	(avg)	 6.36 3.37 1 10 4.86	 6.48	
GDP	(log)	 2.85 2.16 ‐1.77 9.33 2.30	 3.03	
Population	(log)	 16.16 1.50 12.47 20.80 16.26	 16.09	
Civil	War	 0.18 0.83 0.00 7.00 0.44	 0.07	
Electoral	Fraud	 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.68	 0.27	

























































































































































































































Unfavorable	Polls	 2.37*	 4.97*	 2.40+	 2.63*	
		 1.07	 2.15	 1.43	 1.29	
Polling		*	Exec.	Const.	 ‐0.49*	 ‐0.87*	 ‐0.58*	 ‐0.62*	
		 0.20	 0.37	 0.27	 0.27	
Executive	Constraints	 0.24	 0.53+	 0.48+	 0.44+	
		 0.21	 0.31	 0.28	 0.26	
Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 ‐0.44**	 ‐0.61**	 ‐0.40**	 ‐0.34*	
		 0.12	 0.20	 0.13	 0.17	
Political	Competitiveness	
(avg)	 ‐0.18+	 ‐0.38+	 ‐0.19	 ‐0.24+	
		 0.10	 0.21	 0.13	 0.14	
Executive	Recruitment	(avg)	 0.31+	 0.73*	 0.34+	 0.13	
		 0.16	 0.34	 0.20	 0.25	
Population	(log)	 0.36	 0.87*	 0.81*	 1.25	
		 0.27	 0.44	 0.35	 2.03	
GDP	(log)	 ‐0.28	 ‐0.60*	 ‐0.68**	 1.03	
		 0.19	 0.30	 0.25	 1.03	
Leader	Tenure	 0.00	 0.01	 ‐0.02*	 ‐0.01	
		 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	
Leader	Age	 0.12	 0.02	 0.16	 0.28	
		 0.17	 0.27	 0.19	 0.23	
Civil	War	 0.54*	 0.53	 0.75*	 0.71	
		 0.28	 0.60	 0.32	 0.56	
Electoral	Fraud	 1.60**	 2.02**	 1.10*	 1.53**	
		 0.42	 0.76	 0.48	 0.50	
Demonstrations	 0.12*	 0.09	 0.12*	 0.08	
		 0.05	 0.08	 0.06	 0.06	
Observations	 599	 352	 597	 248	
Log	Likelihood	 ‐227.1	 ‐99.80	 ‐188.8	 ‐75.57	
Country	Random	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
Country	Fixed	Effects	 No	 No	 No	 Yes	
Explicit	Civilian	Violence	Only	 No	 No	 Yes	 Yes	


















Victory	Uncertain	 3.17*	 1.46	 1.50	
		 1.32	 1.36	 1.56	
Uncertain		*	Exec.	Const.	 ‐0.52*	 ‐0.30	 ‐0.23	
		 0.23	 0.24	 0.27	
Executive	Constraints	 ‐0.11	 0.07	 ‐0.06	
		 0.15	 0.18	 0.18	
Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 ‐0.38**	 ‐0.32*	 ‐0.33+	
		 0.11	 0.13	 0.19	
Political	Competitiveness	
(avg)	 ‐0.16	 ‐0.17	 ‐0.21	
		 0.11	 0.13	 0.17	
Executive	Recruitment	(avg)	 0.27+	 0.32+	 0.12	
		 0.16	 0.19	 0.29	
Population	(log)	 0.30	 0.80*	 1.00	
		 0.26	 0.32	 2.06	
GDP	(log)	 ‐0.16	 ‐0.51*	 0.86	
		 0.18	 0.23	 1.05	
Leader	Tenure	 0.01	 ‐0.02	 ‐0.01	
		 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	
Leader	Age	 0.06	 0.02	 0.16	
		 0.17	 0.20	 0.24	
Civil	War	 0.46+	 0.72*	 0.73	
		 0.27	 0.31	 0.59	
Electoral	Fraud	 1.55**	 1.07*	 1.42**	
		 0.42	 0.47	 0.53	
Demonstrations	 0.11*	 0.11*	 0.08	
		 0.05	 0.06	 0.06	
Observations	 550	 548	 216	
Log	Likelihood	 ‐207.5	 ‐173.9	 ‐68.96	
Country	Random	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
Country	Fixed	Effects	 No	 No	 Yes	
Explicit	Civilian	Violence	











































































































































Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 ‐0.12	 ‐0.14	 ‐0.11	 ‐0.13	
		 0.08	 0.10	 0.09	 0.11	
Polity	(avg)	 0.00	 0.01	 ‐0.02	 ‐0.02	
		 0.03	 0.03	 0.03	 0.04	
Population	(log)	 0.26	 ‐1.51	 0.24	 ‐1.70	
		 0.20	 1.33	 0.22	 1.41	
GDP	(log)	 ‐0.26+	 1.01	 ‐0.24	 1.10	
		 0.15	 0.72	 0.15	 0.81	
Leader	Tenure	 ‐0.01*	 ‐0.01	 ‐0.02**	 ‐0.02*	
		 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	
Leader	Age	 ‐0.10	 ‐0.03	 ‐0.13	 ‐0.07	
		 0.13	 0.16	 0.14	 0.17	
Civil	War	 0.04	 0.04	 ‐0.11	 ‐0.12	
		 0.14	 0.19	 0.14	 0.21	
Observations	 966	 482	 932	 458	
Log	Likelihood	 ‐347.1	 ‐179.2	 ‐314.4	 ‐152.6	
Country	Random‐Effects	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	
Country	Fixed‐Effects	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	
+signiﬁcant	at	10%;	*signiﬁcant	at	5%;	**signiﬁcant	at	1%.	Standard	errors	are	in	
parentheses.	All	models	are	restricted	to	elections	in	which	the	incumbent	did	not	lose	
the	election	and	leave	office.	
																																																								
94	As	discussed	above,	this	variable	indicates	whether	there	was	“domestic	or	international	
concern”	about	the	quality	of	the	election	or	if	“the	elections	were	widely	perceived	to	lack	basic	
criteria	for	competitive	elections,	such	as	more	than	one	political	party.”Ibid.	
95	Marshall	and	Jaggers	2002.	
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We	present	logit	estimates	of	these	equations	in	Table	4	and	illustrate	the	
results	of	our	core	models	in	Figure	6,	which	shows	the	simulated	effect	of	Pre‐
Election	Violence	and	Electoral	Fraud	on	the	predicted	probability	of	Post‐
Election	Violence	Protest	when	all	other	variables	are	held	at	mean	values.	Our	
core	models	(in	columns	1	and	3)	include	country	random‐effects	and	we	show	
the	same	models	(in	columns	2	and	4)	with	country	fixed‐effects.			
Figure	6:	Effect	of	Fraud	and	Election	Violence	on	Post‐Election	Protest	
	
Shows	the	simulated	effect	(predicted	probabilities)	of	Electoral	Fraud	and	Pre‐Election	
Violence	on	Post‐Election	Protest	from	the	estimates	in	Table	4	column	1	and	3.	All	other	
variables	are	set	at	the	mean.		Vertical	lines	indicate	the	95%	confidence	interval.	
	
Consistent	with	the	literature,	we	find	that	both	electoral	fraud	and	pre‐
election	violence	are	strong	predictors	of	post‐election	protest:	both	variables	
are	associated	with	sizable	increases	in	the	probability	of	protest	across	both	
specifications.96	As	shown	in	Figure	6,	Electoral	Fraud	increases	the	probability	
of	protests	by	nearly	0.13.	Pre‐Election	Violence	increases	the	probability	of	
																																																								
96	Bunce	and	Wolchik	2010;	Magaloni	2006a;	Tucker	2007.	
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protests	by	over	0.20.	The	fact	that	pre‐election	violence	increases	the	likelihood	
of	post‐election	protest	suggests	that	the	use	of	pre‐election	violence	can	also	
have	unintended	consequences	for	the	incumbent	after	the	election.	
The	existence	of	post‐election	protests	allows	us	to	evaluate	a	final	
implication	of	our	argument:	given	that	the	incumbent	faces	post‐election	
protests,	she	is	more	likely	to	use	violence	against	protestors	in	the	post‐election	
period	if	she	lacks	significant	institutional	constraints.	Our	approach	for	
estimating	post‐election	violence	against	protestors	is	represented	below	for	
each	election	i	in	country	j:	
Pr(Post‐Election	Violenceij=1)=	f	(β2Executive	Constraintsij		+	φXij	+	γi	+	εij,)	
(Equation	5)	
We	measure	Post‐Election	Violence	using	Nelda31,	which	indicates,	in	
cases	of	post‐election	protest,	whether	the	government	used	violence	against	
demonstrators.	This	variable	equals	1	if	the	incumbent	used	violence	against	
demonstrators	and	0	otherwise.	As	in	the	above	models,	control	variables	include	
the	three‐year	(lagged)	moving	average	of	Physical	Integrity,	Political	
Competitiveness,	and	Executive	Recruitment,	as	well	as	GDP	(log),	Population	(log),	
Leader	Tenure	and	Leader	Age	and	Civil	War.	We	also	include	Pre‐Election	
Violence	as	an	additional	control	to	ensure	that	we	are	not	picking	up	the	overall	
likelihood	of	incumbents	to	use	election	violence.97	Since	violence	against	
protesters	is	only	possible	when	protests	occur,	we	include	in	this	sample	only	
elections	in	which	post‐election	protests	occurred,	regardless	of	whether	or	not	
																																																								
97	Only	20	per	cent	of	elections	with	pre‐election	violence	also	involve	the	use	of	post‐election	
violence,	however	85	per	cent	of	the	elections	with	post‐election	violence	also	had	pre‐election	
violence.		
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the	incumbent	decided	to	exit	power	after	the	election.			
Table	5:	Logit	Estimates	of	the	Effect	of	Executive	Constraints	on	Post‐
Election	Violence	
		
(1)
Core	Model	
(2)
Fixed	Effects	
		 		 		
Executive	Constraints	 ‐0.45*	 ‐0.58+	
		 0.22	 0.34	
Pre‐Election	Violence	 1.44*	 ‐0.14	
		 0.60	 0.89	
Physical	Integrity	(avg)	 ‐0.21	 0.19	
		 0.17	 0.42	
Political	Competitiveness	(avg)	 ‐0.19	 ‐0.95*	
		 0.15	 0.43	
Executive	Recruitment	(avg)	 0.32	 0.77	
		 0.22	 0.47	
Population	(log)	 ‐0.52	 6.63	
		 0.36	 5.16	
GDP	(log)	 0.47	 1.41	
		 0.30	 2.31	
Leader	Tenure	 ‐0.01	 ‐0.03	
		 0.01	 0.03	
Leader	Age	 0.58*	 1.13+	
		 0.29	 0.64	
Civil	War	 ‐0.08	 0.22	
		 0.29	 0.44	
Observations	 160	 92	
Log	Likelihood	 ‐88.37	 ‐25.42	
Country	Random	Effects	 Yes	 Yes	
Country	Fixed	Effects	 No	 No	
+signiﬁcant	at	10%;	*signiﬁcant	at	5%;	**signiﬁcant	at	1%.	Standard	errors	are	in	
parentheses.	All	models	are	restricted	to	election	in	which	post‐election	protests	
occurred.	
	
We	report	logit	estimates	of	this	equation	in	Table	5.	Column	1	reports	
estimates	that	include	random	effects,	and	column	2	reports	estimates	including	
country	fixed‐effects.	Our	results	are	consistent	across	both	random‐effect	and	
fixed‐effect	specifications:	the	coefficients	on	Executive	Constraints	are	negative	
and	statistically	significant.	Figure	7	shows	the	predicted	effects	from	column	1	
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of	Table	5.	A	decrease	in	Executive	Constraints	from	7	to	1	increases	the	average	
probability	of	violence	from	0.22	to	0.73,	suggesting	again	that	the	incentives	to	
repress	protesters	are	mitigated	by	the	presence	of	institutionalized	constraints.			
Figure	7:	The	Effect	of	Executive	Constraints	on	Post‐Election	Violence	
	
Shows	the	simulated	effect	(predicted	probabilities)	of	Executive	Constraints	on	Post‐
Election	Violence	from	the	estimates	in	Table	5	column	1.	All	other	variables	are	set	at	
the	mean.		Vertical	lines	indicate	the	95%	confidence	interval.	
	
CONCLUSION	
Using	newly	available	data	for	all	elections	held	in	the	world,	1981‐2004,	
this	article	evaluated	the	conditions	under	which	governments	are	most	likely	to	
use	violence	as	an	election	strategy.	These	new	data	have	several	advantages.	
They	measure	specific	forms	of	electoral	violence	directly	rather	than	assuming	
election	violence	is	measured	by	annual	measures	of	political	repression.	They	
separate	pre‐	and	post‐election	violence.	And	they	measure	important	variation	
in	the	popularity	of	incumbents	and	the	information	available	to	them	about	the	
potential	threats	induced	by	the	election.	In	contrast	to	previous	research,	we	
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have	shown	that	incumbent	leaders	are	more	likely	to	resort	to	repression—
specifically	violence—against	political	opposition	candidates,	voters,	or	citizens	
when	they	fear	losing	power	but	have	few	institutionalized	constraints	on	their	
decision	making	power.	We	have	also	shown	that	pre‐election	violence	can	have	
the	unintended	consequence	of	increasing	the	probability	of	post‐election	
protest,	and	that	once	post‐election	protests	are	initiated	against	the	incumbent	
regime,	institutionalized	constraints	on	the	executive	can	reduce	incentives	for	
the	government	to	respond	with	violence.	Using	new	monthly	data	and	examples	
from	Zimbabwe	and	Iran,	we	provided	illustrations	for	our	core	argument	that	
incumbent	governments	are	likely	to	use	election	violence	when	they	fear	losing	
power—because	they	possess	some	information	that	they	are	unpopular—and	
face	few	institutionalized	constraints.		
It	is	clear	is	that	as	elections	have	spread	to	nearly	all	countries,	some	
incumbents—including	those	in	countries	like	Azerbaijan,	Cambodia,	Iran,	or	
Zimbabwe—have	used	a	strategy	of	violence	in	an	effort	to	stay	in	power.	In	
effect,	elections	exacerbate	human	rights	violations	in	these	places	in	the	short	
term;	without	elections,	the	violations	would	probably	be	fewer.	However,	our	
results	do	not	speak	to	whether	or	not	leaders	who	use	election	violence	actually	
succeed	in	staying	in	power,	or	whether	periods	of	electorally	induced	political	
violence	are	inevitable	parts	of	political	liberalization.98	Many	of	the	world’s	
longest‐standing	consolidated	democracies,	including	France,	the	United	
Kingdom,	and	the	United	States,	experienced	periods	of	election	violence.99	This	
																																																								
98	Analysis	of	this	question	is	presented	in	Hafner‐Burton,	Hyde,	and	Jablonski	2011.	
99	See,	for	example,	Hoppen	1984;	Keyssar	2009;	Zeldin	1958.		
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history	raises	fundamental	questions	about	the	long‐term	relationship	between	
political	violence,	elections,	and	democratization.	Some	scholars	and	pundits	may	
be	tempted	to	interpret	the	fact	that	leaders	sometimes	use	political	violence	to	
manipulate	elections	as	confirmation	that	elections	are	necessarily	“bad”	for	
countries	without	a	history	of	elections	and	democracy.	Yet	our	analysis	does	not	
support	this	conclusion.			
Rather,	several	important	implications	follow	from	the	evidence	we	
provide	in	this	article.	First,	the	countries	that	are	most	likely	to	experience	
election	violence	are	precisely	those	places	in	which	the	incumbent	government	
feels	threatened	by	an	organized	and	potentially	powerful	opposition.	Although	
all	repression	is	clearly	detrimental	to	democracy	in	the	short	term,	competition	
is	necessary	for	democracy	in	both	the	short	and	the	long	term.	If	our	analysis	is	
correct,	then	more	often	than	not,	election	violence	may	be	a	symptom	of	a	
threatened	and	potentially	weakening	incumbent	government	rather	than	a	sign	
that	democratization—and	future	protection	for	human	rights—is	doomed.		
Second,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	our	analysis	draws	attention	to	the	
fact	that	there	are	a	variety	of	sources	for	information	about	the	incumbent’s	
popularity	(that	to	our	knowledge	have	never	been	studied	systematically)	that	
can	help	predict	the	likelihood	of	election	violence.	Though	it	may	seem	self‐
evident	to	suggest	that	incumbents	turn	to	violence	when	they	feel	threatened,	it	
is	not	obvious	how	to	gauge	these	threats.	That	is	why	anticipating	actual	
election	violence	in	the	real	world	has	been	extremely	difficult	to	do;	even	the	
most	dedicated	organizations	that	support	democratic	elections	are	rarely	able	to	
predict	when	violence	will	break	out.	Predicting	violence	is	not	just	an	academic	
exercise;	understanding	the	conditions	under	which	election	violence	is	most	
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likely	to	occur	and	how	it	can	be	mitigated	is	important	because	such	information	
can	inform	the	strategies	of	NGOs,	international	organizations,	and	other	
interested	actors,	allowing	them	to	better	anticipate	where	measures	aimed	at	
preventing	election	violence	are	most	likely	to	be	useful.	
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